



EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

KEY CASE-LAW ISSUES

**PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY AND FORCED
LABOUR
ARTICLE 4 OF THE CONVENTION**

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I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article 4

1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.
3. For the purpose of this Article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not include:
 - a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such detention;
 - b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;
 - c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community;;
 - d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.

1. Structure of Article 4

1. Article 4 of the Convention, together with Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies (see *Siliadin v. France*, § 112 and *Stummer v. Austria* [GC], § 116).

2. Article 4 § 1 of the Convention requires that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 4 § 1 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (*C.N. v. the United Kingdom*, § 65; and *Stummer v. Austria* [GC], § 116).

3. Article 4 § 2 of the Convention prohibits forced or compulsory labour (*Stummer v. Austria*, § 116).

4. Article 4 § 3 of the Convention is not intended to “limit” the exercise of the right guaranteed by paragraph 2, but to “delimit” the very content of that right, for it forms a whole with paragraph 2 and indicates what the term “forced or compulsory labour” is not to include (*Stummer v. Austria*, § 120). This being so, paragraph 3 serves as an aid to the interpretation of paragraph 2. The four subparagraphs of paragraph 3, notwithstanding their diversity, are grounded on the governing ideas of general interest, social solidarity and what is normal in the ordinary course of affairs (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 38; *Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany*, § 22; and *Zarb Adami v. Malta*, § 44).

2. Principles of interpretation

5. The Court has never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole framework of reference for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein. It has long stated that one of the main principles of the application of the Convention provisions is that it does not apply them in a vacuum. As an international treaty, the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties. Under that Convention, the Court is required to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the provision from which they are drawn. The Court must have regard to the fact that the context of the provision is a treaty for the effective protection of individual human rights and that the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions. Account must also be taken of any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in

relations between the Contracting Parties and the Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part. The object and purpose of the Convention, as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings, requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, §§ 273-275).

6. In interpreting the concepts under Article 4 of the Convention, the Court relies on international instruments such as the 1926 Slavery Convention (*Siliadin v. France*, § 122), Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (*C.N. and V. v. France*, § 90), ILO Convention No. 29 (Forced Labour Convention) (*Van der Musselle v. Belgium*, § 32) and Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000 (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 282).

7. Sight should not be lost of the Convention's special features or of the fact that it is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, and that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies (*Siliadin v. France*, § 121; and *Stummer v. Austria*, § 118).

3. Specific context of human trafficking

8. Article 4 makes no mention of trafficking, proscribing “slavery”, “servitude” and “forced and compulsory labour” (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 272).

9. Having regard the proliferation of both trafficking itself and of measures taken to combat it, it is appropriate to examine the extent to which trafficking itself may be considered to run counter to the spirit and purpose of Article 4 of the Convention such as to fall within the scope of the guarantees offered by that Article without the need to assess which of the three types of proscribed conduct are engaged by the particular treatment in the case in question (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 279).

10. Trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere. It implies close surveillance of the activities of victims, whose movements are often circumscribed. It involves the use of violence and threats against victims, who live and work under poor conditions. It is described in the explanatory report accompanying the Anti-Trafficking Convention as the modern form of the old worldwide slave trade (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 281 and *M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria*, § 151).

11. There can be no doubt that trafficking threatens the human dignity and fundamental freedoms of its victims and cannot be considered compatible with a democratic society and the values expounded in the Convention (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 282). In these circumstances, trafficking itself, within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article 4(a) of the Anti-Trafficking Convention, falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention (*Ibid*, and *M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria*, § 151).

II. THE PROHIBITION OF SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOUR

1. Freedom from slavery or servitude

Article 4 § 1

“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.”

a. Slavery

12. In considering the scope of “*slavery*” under Article 4, the Court refers to the classic definition of slavery contained in the 1926 Slavery Convention, which defines slavery as “*the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised*” (*Siliadin v. France*, § 122).

13. In *Siliadin*, where the applicant, an eighteen years old Togolese national, was made to work as a domestic servant fifteen hours a day without a day off or pay for several years, the Court found that the treatment suffered by her amounted to servitude and forced and compulsory labour, although it fell short of slavery. It held that, although the applicant was, clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, she was not held in slavery as there was no genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an “*object*” (*Ibid*).

14. In a recent case concerning alleged trafficking of a minor girl, the Court also considered that there was not sufficient evidence indicating that she was held in slavery. It held that, even assuming that the applicant’s father received a sum of money in respect of the alleged marriage, in the circumstances of that case, such a monetary contribution could not be considered to amount to a price attached to the transfer of ownership, which would bring into play the concept of slavery. In this connection, the Court reiterated that marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ largely from one society to another and that therefore this payment can reasonably be accepted as representing a gift from one family to another, a tradition common to many different cultures in today’s society (*M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria*, § 161).

b. Servitude

15. For Convention purposes “*servitude*” means an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of slavery (*Siliadin v. France*, § 124; and *Seguin v. France* (dec.)).

16. With regard to the concept of “*servitude*”, what is prohibited is “particularly serious form of denial of freedom”. It includes, “*in addition to the obligation to perform certain services for others ... the obligation for the “serf” to live on another person’s property and the impossibility of altering his condition*” (*Siliadin v. France*, § 123).

17. The Court noted that servitude was a specific form of forced or compulsory labour, or, in other words, “*aggravated*” forced or compulsory labour. In the instant case, the essential element distinguishing servitude from forced or compulsory labour within the meaning of Article 4 was the victims’ feeling that their condition could not be altered and that there was no potential for change. In this respect, it was enough that that feeling was based on objective elements created or maintained by those responsible (*C.N. and V. v. France*, § 91).

18. Domestic servitude is a specific offence, distinct from trafficking and exploitation and which involves a complex set of dynamics, involving both overt and more subtle forms of coercion, to force compliance (*C.N. v. the United Kingdom*, § 80).

19. In *Siliadin v. France* the Court considered that the applicant was held in servitude because, in addition to the fact that the applicant was required to perform forced labour, she

was a minor with no resources, vulnerable and isolated with no means of living elsewhere than the home where she worked at their mercy and completely depended on them with no freedom of movement and no free time (§§ 126-127). See also *C.N. and V. v. France* where the Court found the first applicant to be held in servitude but not the second applicant (§§ 92-93).

2. Freedom from forced or compulsory labour

Article 4 § 2

“No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.”

20. Article 4 § 2 of the Convention prohibits forced or compulsory labour (*Stummer v. Austria*, § 116). However, Article 4 does not define what is meant by “forced or compulsory labour” and no guidance on this point is to be found in the various Council of Europe documents relating to the preparatory work of the European Convention (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 32).

21. In the case of *Van der Mussele* the Court had recourse to ILO Convention No. 29 concerning forced or compulsory labour. For the purposes of that Convention the term “forced or compulsory labour” means “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”. The Court has taken that definition as a starting point for its interpretation of Article 4 § 2 of the Convention (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 32; *Graziani-Weiss v. Austria*; *Stummer v. Austria*, § 118).

22. It is true that the English word “labour” is often used in the narrow sense of manual work, but it also bears the broad meaning of the French word “travail” and it is the latter that should be adopted in the present context. The Court finds corroboration of this in the definition included in Article 2 § 1 of Convention No. 29 (“all work or service”, “tout travail ou service”), in Article 4 § 3(d) of the European Convention (“any work or service”, “tout travail ou service”) and in the very name of the International Labour Organisation (Organisation internationale du Travail), whose activities are in no way limited to the sphere of manual labour. (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 33).

23. The first adjective “forced” brings to mind the idea of physical or mental constraint. As regards the second adjective “compulsory”, it cannot refer just to any form of legal compulsion or obligation. For example, work to be carried out in pursuance of a freely negotiated contract cannot be regarded as falling within the scope of Article 4 on the sole ground that one of the parties has undertaken with the other to do that work and will be subject to sanctions if he does not honour his promise (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 34). What there has to be is work “exacted ... under the menace of any penalty” and also performed against the will of the person concerned, that is work for which he “has not offered himself voluntarily” (*Ibid*).

24. The Court has found the first criteria, namely “the menace of any penalty”, fulfilled in *Van der Mussele v. Belgium* where the applicant, a pupil advocate, ran the risk of having the Council of the *Ordre des avocats* strike his name off the roll of pupils or reject his application for entry on the register of advocates (§ 35), in *Graziani-Weiss v. Austria* where the refusal of the applicant, a lawyer, to act as a guardian gave rise to disciplinary sanctions (§ 39), in *C.N. and V. v. France* where the applicant was threatened to be sent back to her country of origin (§ 78).

25. In *Siliadin v. France* the Court considered that, although the applicant, a minor, was not threatened by a “penalty”, the fact remained that she was in an equivalent situation in

terms of the perceived seriousness of the threat as she was an adolescent girl in a foreign land, unlawfully present on French territory and in fear of arrest by the police. Her fear was nurtured and she was led to believe that her status would be regularised (§ 118).

26. As to the second criteria, namely whether the applicant offered himself voluntarily for the work in question (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 36), the Court takes into account but does not give decisive weight to the element of the applicant's prior consent to the tasks required (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 36; *Graziani-Weiss v. Austria*, § 40).

27. Rather, the Court will have regard to all the circumstances of the case in the light of the underlying objectives of Article 4 when deciding whether a service required to be performed falls within the prohibition of “*forced or compulsory labour*” (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, § 37; and *Bucha v. Slovakia* (dec.)). The standards developed by the Court for evaluating what could be considered normal in respect of duties incumbent on members of a particular profession take into account whether the services rendered fall outside the ambit of the normal professional activities of the person concerned; whether the services are remunerated or not or whether the service includes another compensatory factor; whether the obligation is founded on a conception of social solidarity; and whether the burden imposed is disproportionate (*Graziani-Weiss v. Austria*, § 38).

28. In *Van Der Mussele*, the Court accepted that the applicant, a pupil-advocat, had suffered some prejudice by reason of the lack of remuneration and of reimbursement of expenses, but that prejudice went hand in hand with advantages and had not been shown to be excessive. It held that while remunerated work may also qualify as forced or compulsory labour, the lack of remuneration and of reimbursement of expenses constitutes a relevant factor when considering what is proportionate or in the normal course of business. Noting that the applicant had not had a disproportionate burden of work imposed on him and that the amount of expenses directly occasioned by the cases in question had been relatively small, the Court concluded that in that case there had been no compulsory labour for the purposes of Article 4 § 2 of the Convention (*Van der Mussele v. Belgium*, §§ 34-41)

29. More recently, the Court concluded that a physician's obligation to participate in emergency medical service did not amount to compulsory or forced labour for the purposes of Article 4 § 2 and declared the relevant part of the application inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded (*Steindel v. Germany* (dec.)). In that case the Court considered relevant, in particular, (i) that the services to be rendered were remunerated and did not fall outside the ambit of a physician's normal professional activities; (ii) the obligation in issue was founded on a concept of professional and civil solidarity and was aimed at averting emergencies; and (iii) the burden imposed on the applicant was not disproportionate (*idem*).

30. The Court specified that not all work required from an individual under threat of a “*penalty*” necessarily amounted to “*forced or obligatory labour*” as prohibited by this Article. It was necessary to take into account, among other things, the nature and amount of the work in issue. Those circumstances made it possible to distinguish “*forced labour*” from work which could reasonably be required in respect of mutual family assistance or cohabitation (*C.N. and V. v. France*, § 74).

31. No issue was found to arise under Article 4 in cases where an employee was not paid for work done but the work was performed voluntarily and entitlement to payment was not in dispute (*Sokur v. Ukraine* (dec.)), where the applicant was transferred to a less lucrative employment (*Antonov v. Russia* (dec.)), where the social assistance act required the applicant to obtain and accept any kind of labour, irrespective of the question whether it would be suitable or not, by reducing her benefits if she refused to do so (*Schuitemaker v. the Netherlands* (dec.)) or where the applicant, a notary, was required to receive reduced fees

when acting for non-profit making organisations (*X v. Germany*, Commission decision of 13 December 1979¹).

3. Delimitations

Article 4 § 3

“For the purpose of this Article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not include:

- a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such detention;
- b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;
- c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community;
- d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. ;

a. Work during detention or conditional release

32. Article 4 § 3(a) authorises work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention which has been imposed in a manner that does not infringe paragraph 1 of Article 5 (*Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium*, § 59) or during conditional release from such detention.

33. In establishing what is to be considered “work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention”, the Court will have regard to the standards prevailing in member States (*Stummer v. Austria* [GC], § 128).

34. For example, when the Court had to consider work a recidivist prisoner was required to perform, his release being conditional on accumulating a certain amount of savings, while accepting that the work at issue was obligatory, the Court found no violation of Article 4 of the Convention on the ground that the requirements of Article 4 § 3 (a) were met (*Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium*, § 59). In the Court’s view the work required did not go beyond what is ‘ordinary’ in this context since it was calculated to assist him in reintegrating himself into society and had as its legal basis provisions which find an equivalent in certain other member States of the Council of Europe (*Stummer v. Austria* [GC], § 121; *Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium*, § 59; and *De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium*, § 90).

35. As regards prisoners’ remuneration and social cover, the Commission has held that Article 4 does not concern the remuneration of prisoners for their work. In this connection, it referred to its consistent case-law, which had rejected as being inadmissible, any applications by prisoners claiming higher payment for their work (*Stummer v. Austria* [GC], § 122). In so far as work performed on behalf of private firms under contracts concluded with the prison administration is concerned, the Commission has held that Article 4 § 3(a), which deals with the question of prison labour, contains nothing to prevent the State from concluding such contracts or to indicate that a prisoner’s obligation to work must be limited to work to be performed within the prison and for the State itself (*Twenty-one detained persons v. Germany*, Commission decision of 6 April 1968).

36. Recently, the Court was called upon to examine the question whether Article 4 requires the State to include working prisoners in the social security system, notably, as regards the old-age pension system. It noted that while an absolute majority of Contracting States affiliate prisoners in some way to the national social security system or provides them with some specific insurance scheme, only a small majority affiliate working prisoners to the old-age pension system. Thus Austrian law reflects the development of European law in that

¹. European Commission of Human Rights (The Commission), which originally received individual complaints, was abolished after Protocol 11, which came into force in 1998.

all prisoners are provided with health and accident care and working prisoners are affiliated to the unemployment insurance scheme but not to the old-age pension system (*Stummer v. Austria* [GC], § 131). It therefore considered that there was no sufficient consensus on the issue of the affiliation of working prisoners to the old-age pension system. It held that while Rule 26.17 of the European Prison Rules, which provides that as far as possible, prisoners who work shall be included in national social security systems, reflects an evolving trend, it cannot be translated into an obligation under Article 4 of the Convention. Consequently, the obligatory work performed by the applicant as a prisoner without being affiliated to the old-age pension system had to be regarded as “*work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention*” within the meaning of Article 4 § 3(a) (*Ibid*, § 132).

b. Military service or substitute civilian service

37. Article 4 § 3(b) excludes from the scope of “*forced or compulsory labour*” prohibited by Article 4 § 2 “*any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service*”. (*Bayatyan v. Armenia* [GC], § 100, *Johansen v. Norway*, Commission decision of 14 October 1985).

38. In the case of *W., X., Y. and Z. v. The United Kingdom*, where the applicants were minors when they entered into the armed forces of the United Kingdom, the Commission held that the service entered into by the applicants was subject to the limiting provision under Article 4 § 3, and therefore any complaint that such service constituted “*forced or compulsory labour*” had to be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded in view of the express provision of Article 4 § 2(b) of the Convention (Commission decision of 19 July 1968).

39. The Commission has held, however, that “*servitude*” and “*forced or compulsory labour*” are distinguished in Article 4 and, although they must in fact often overlap, they cannot be treated as equivalent, and that the clause excluding military service expressly from the scope of the term “*forced or compulsory labour*” does not forcibly exclude such service in all circumstances from an examination in the light of the prohibition directed against “*slavery or servitude*” (*W., X., Y. and Z. v. The United Kingdom*, Commission decision of 19 July 1968). The Commission held that generally the duty of a soldier who enlists after having attained the age of majority, to observe the terms of his engagement and the ensuing restriction of his freedom and personal rights does not amount to an impairment of rights which could come under the terms of “*slavery or servitude*” (*Ibid*). It found that the young age of the applicants who had entered into the services with their parents’ consent cannot attribute the character “*servitude*” to the normal condition of a soldier (*Ibid*).

40. The Commission case-law drew a link between Article 9 and Article 4 § 3(b) of the Convention, finding that the latter left the choice of recognising a right to conscientious objection to the Contracting Parties. Consequently, conscientious objectors were excluded from the scope of protection of Article 9, which could not be read as guaranteeing freedom from prosecution for refusal to serve in the army (*Bayatyan v. Armenia* [GC], § 99).

41. The Court considered, however, that Article 4 § 3 (b) neither recognises nor excludes a right to conscientious objection and should therefore not have a delimiting effect on the rights guaranteed by Article 9 (*Ibid*, § 100). It has therefore held that Article 9 should no longer be read in conjunction with Article 4 § 3(b) in such cases (*Ibid*, § 109).

c. Service required during an emergency or calamity

42. Article 4 § 3(c) excludes any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community from the scope of forced or compulsory labour. In this connection, the Commission held that obligation of a holder of shooting rights to actively participate in the gassing of fox-holes as part of a campaign against an epidemic –

even if the above obligation fell within the notion of compulsory labour- was justified under Article 4 § 3(c) which allows the exaction of services in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-being of the community, or under Article 4 § 3(d) which allows service which forms part of normal civic obligations (*S. v. the Federal Republic of Germany*, Commission decision of 4 October 1984). In a case, which concerned a requirement that the applicant serve a year in the public dental service in northern Norway, two members of the Commission held the view that the service in question was service reasonably required of the applicant in an emergency threatening the well-being of the community and was not forced or compulsory labour (*Iversen v. Norway*, Commission decision of 17 December 1963).

d. Normal civic obligations

43. Article 4 § 3(d) excludes any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations from the scope of forced or compulsory labour (*Van der Musselle v. Belgium*, § 38). The Commission and the Court have found that “any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations” includes: compulsory jury service (*Zarb Adami v. Malta*); compulsory fire service or financial contribution which is payable in lieu of service (*Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany*); obligation to conduct free medical examinations (*Paul Reitmayr v. Austria*); the obligation to participate in the medical emergency service (*Steindel v. Germany*); or the legal obligations imposed on companies in their quality of employers to calculate and withhold certain taxes, social security contributions etc from the salaries and wages of their employers (*Four companies v. Austria*, Commission decision of 27 September 1976).

44. However, the criteria which serve to delimit the concept of compulsory labour include the notion of what is in the normal course of business. Work or labour that is in itself normal may in fact be rendered abnormal if the choice of the groups or individuals bound to perform it is governed by discriminatory factors. Therefore in cases where the Court has found that there was no forced or compulsory labour for the purpose of Article 4, it does not follow that the facts in issue fall completely outside the ambit of Article 4 and, hence, of Article 14 (*Van der Musselle v. Belgium*, § 43; *Zarb Adami v. Malta*, § 45). For example, any unjustified discrimination between men and women in the imposition of a civic obligation is in breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 4 of the Convention (*Zarb Adami v. Malta*, § 83; *Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany*, § 29).

III. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS

45. In *Siliadin v. France* the Court noted that, with regard to certain Convention provisions, such as Articles 2, 3 and 8, the fact that a State refrains from infringing the guaranteed rights does not suffice to conclude that it has complied with its obligations under Article 1 of the Convention (§ 77). In this connection, it held that limiting compliance with Article 4 of the Convention only to direct action by the State authorities would be inconsistent with the international instruments specifically concerned with this issue and would amount to rendering it ineffective (*Siliadin v. France*, § 89). It has therefore held that States have positive obligations under Article 4 of the Convention.

1. The positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework

46. Article 4 requires that member States penalise and prosecute effectively any act aimed at maintaining a person in a situation of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour (*C.N. v. the United Kingdom*, § 66; *Siliadin v. France*, § 112; and *C.N. and V. v. France*,

§ 105). In order to comply with this obligation, member States are required to put in place a legislative and administrative framework to prohibit and punish such acts (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 285).

47. In the particular context of trafficking the Court has held that the spectrum of safeguards set out in national legislation must be adequate to ensure the practical and effective protection of the rights of victims or potential victims of trafficking. Accordingly, in addition to criminal law measures to punish traffickers, Article 4 requires member States to put in place adequate measures regulating businesses often used as a cover for human trafficking. Furthermore, a State's immigration rules must address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of trafficking (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 285). In addition, States are required to provide relevant training for law enforcement and immigration officials (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 287).

48. The Court found the legislation in force at the material time did not afford the applicants practical and effective protection against treatment falling within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention in *Siliadin v. France*, § 148; in *C.N. and V. v. France*, § 108; and in *C.N. v. the United Kingdom*, § 76. Whereas in *Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, on the basis of the evidence before it and bearing in mind the limits of Russian jurisdiction in the particular facts of the case, the Court found no such failure in the legislative and administrative framework in Russia with respect to trafficking (§§ 301- 303). In that case, Cyprus was found to be in violation of this obligation because, despite evidence of trafficking in Cyprus and the concerns expressed in various reports that Cypriot immigration policy and legislative shortcomings were encouraging the trafficking of women to Cyprus, its regime of artiste visas did not afford to Ms Rantseva practical and effective protection against trafficking and exploitation (§§ 290-293).

2. The positive obligation to take protective measures

49. Article 4 of the Convention may, in certain circumstances, require a State to take operational measures to protect victims, or potential victims, of treatment in breach of that Article (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 286, *C.N. v. the United Kingdom*, § 67). In order for a positive obligation to take operational measures to arise in the circumstances of a particular case, it must be demonstrated that the State authorities were aware, or ought to have been aware, of circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that an identified individual had been, or was at real and immediate risk of being subjected to treatment in breach of Article 4 of the Convention. In the case of an answer in the affirmative, there will be a violation of that Article where the authorities fail to take appropriate measures within the scope of their powers to remove the individual from that situation or risk (*Ibid*).

50. However, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the obligation to take operational measures must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 287).

51. In *Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, various failures of the police, notably, to inquire further into whether Ms Rantseva had been trafficked, the decision to confide her to the custody of M.A and their failure to comply with various domestic law provisions led the Court to find that the Cypriot authorities had failed to take measures to protect the applicant's daughter, Ms Rantseva from trafficking (§ 298).

52. In *V.F. v. France* the Court, while conscious of the scale of the phenomenon of trafficking of Nigerian women in France and the difficulties experienced by those persons in identifying themselves to the authorities in order to obtain protection, could only note, in the

light of the circumstances of the case, that the applicant had not attempted to contact the authorities about her situation. It was therefore of the opinion that the evidence submitted by the applicant was not sufficient to demonstrate that the police authorities knew or ought to have known that the applicant was the victim of a human trafficking network when they decided to deport her.

3. *The procedural obligation to investigate*

53. Article 4 of the Convention entails a procedural obligation to investigate where there is a credible suspicion that an individual's rights under that Article have been violated (*C.N. v. the United Kingdom*, § 69 and *Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 288).

54. The Court underlines that the requirement to investigate does not depend on a complaint from the victim or next-of-kin but that the authorities must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention. It further affirms that for an investigation to be effective, it must be independent from those implicated in the events and that it must also be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of individuals responsible, an obligation not of result but of means. Moreover, a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in all cases but where the possibility of removing the individual from the harmful situation is available, the investigation must be undertaken as a matter of urgency. Finally, the victim or the next-of-kin must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 288).

55. In the particular context of human trafficking, in addition to the obligation to conduct a domestic investigation into events occurring on their own territories, member states are also subject to a duty in cross-border trafficking cases to cooperate effectively with the relevant authorities of other States concerned in the investigation of events which occurred outside their territories (*Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, § 289).

56. In *Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia*, the Court found that Russian authorities had failed to investigate the possibility that individual agents or networks operating in Russia were involved in trafficking Ms Rantseva to Cyprus (*Ibid*, § 308). In *M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria*, however, the Court has found that the circumstances of the case did not give rise to human trafficking, a situation which would have engaged the responsibility of the Bulgarian State, had any trafficking commenced there (§ 169). In that case, it has further held that the Bulgarian authorities assisted the applicants and maintained constant contact and co-operation with the Italian authorities (*Ibid*).

LIST OF JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS

The Court delivers its judgments and decisions in English and/or French, its two official languages. The hyperlinks to the cases cited in the Guide are linked to the original text of the judgment or decision. The Court's judgments and decisions can be found in the HUDOC database on the Court website (www.echr.coe.int). HUDOC also contains translations of many important cases into some twenty non-official languages, and links to around one hundred online case-law collections produced by third parties.

Court case-law:

Antonov v. Russia (dec.), no. 38020/03, 3 November 2005
Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, ECHR 2011
Bucha v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 43259/07, 20 September 2011
C.N. and V. v. France, no. 67724/09, 11 October 2012
C.N. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4239/08, 13 November 2012
De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, nos. 2832/66, 2835/66 and 2899/66, 18 June 1971
Graziani-Weiss v. Austria, no. 31950/06, 18 October 2011
Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany, 18 July 1994, Series A no. 291-B
M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, no. 40020/03, 31 July 2012
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, ECHR 2010 (extracts)
Seguin v. France (dec.), no. 42400/98, 7 March 2000
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Schuitemaker v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 15906/98, 4 May 2010
Sokur v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 29439/02, 26 November 2002
Steindel v. Germany (dec.), no. 29878/07, 14 September 2010
Stummer v. Austria [GC], no. 37452/02, ECHR 2011
Van der Musselle v. Belgium, 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70
Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50
V.F. v. France (dec.), no. 7196/10, 29 November 2011
Zarb Adami v. Malta, no. 17209/02, ECHR 2006-VIII

Commission case-law:

Four Companies v. Austria, no. 7427/76, 27 September 1976
Iversen v. Norway, no. 1468/62, Commission decision of 17 December 1963
Johansen v. Norway, no. 10600/83, Commission decision of 14 October 1985
Paul Reitmayr v. Austria, no. 23866/94, Commission decision of 28 June 1995
S. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, no. 9686/82, Commission decision of 4 October 1984
Twenty-one detained persons v. Germany, nos. 3134/67, 3172/67, 3188-3206/67, Commission decision of 6 April 1968
X v. Germany, no. 8410/78, Commission decision of 13 December 1979
W., X., Y., and Z. v. the United Kingdom, nos. 3435/67, 3436/67, 3437/67 and 3438/67, Commission decision of 19 July 1968