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**Review on the future of all forms of United Nations
peace operations**

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

This report is submitted pursuant to the request by the General Assembly, in paragraph 42 (b) of the Pact for the Future (action 21), that the Secretary-General undertake a review on the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations. In the report, the Secretary-General describes the spectrum of United Nations peace operations, comprising peacekeeping operations and special political missions, in a changing geopolitical landscape and offers recommendations and commitments for resetting those operations for a new geopolitical era.



I. Peace operations in a changing geopolitical landscape

1. In the new multipolar world, power dynamics are fragmented; emerging poles of influence are becoming more established, and new lines of contestation are taking shape. The world is seeing the largest number of conflicts since 1945. The past 5 years accounted for more battle-related deaths than the entire 20-year period prior to 2021.
2. The rise in inter-State tensions has often evolved into inter-State conflicts and acts of aggression. Inter-State conflicts doubled from 2024 to 2025. More States are notifying the Security Council of their use of the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Such conflicts have, at times, drawn in multiple States and involved non-State armed groups, including in the context of counter-terrorism operations.
3. Internal conflicts are more internationalized, more protracted and deadlier. In several contexts, external intervention and influence has led to sustained fighting, reduced incentives for peace and undermined peacemaking efforts. About half of all internal conflicts today are internationalized in some form. Terrorism and transnational organized crime are enmeshed in local conflict dynamics.
4. The methods and means of warfare are changing as technologies evolve, with profound consequences on civilians and on international peace and security. Conflicts have become domains for artificial intelligence-powered systems, often without effective guardrails. Cyberattacks are disrupting or destroying critical infrastructure in minutes. New technologies blur the boundaries between war and peace, between militaries and civilians and between State and non-State actors. Armed drones and other advanced capabilities, once the preserve of major military powers, are now accessible to a far wider range of actors, including non-State armed groups, enabling them to project force at scale and at low cost. This is providing more States, as well as armed groups, with more leverage to shape how wars are waged.
5. There is a growing and accelerating distortion in the interpretation of international law. Compliance with international law, including with obligations under the Charter, is declining amid criticism that implementation has been subject to double standards. Parties to conflict continue to violate international law, including international humanitarian law, at great cost to civilian lives. Human rights law and the international human rights system have also come under increasing attack.
6. As the strain on international solidarity and multilateralism grows, more and more States are turning away from multilateral processes, prioritizing military spending,¹ while not meeting their funding obligations to the United Nations or dramatically reducing voluntary contributions to international programmes and goals. These trends are constraining progress across the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and peacebuilding and are felt most acutely in humanitarian action. As the world remains critically off track to meet the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, structural inequalities and unsustainable debt burdens in conflict-affected countries further erode States' ability to tackle the socioeconomic drivers of conflict.

Changing political and operational environment for peace operations

7. United Nations peace operations have historically played a vital role in helping resolve conflict. Yet, conflicts today are harder to resolve peacefully. Comprehensive peace agreements are less common; the share of conflicts settled through a peace

¹ In 2024, global military spending reached an all-time high of \$2.7 trillion, marking the tenth consecutive year of growth, increasingly crowding out resources essential for progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (*The Security We Need: Rebalancing Military Spending for a Sustainable and Peaceful Future* (United Nations publication, 2025)).

agreement is the lowest in decades. Stopgap solutions, such as ceasefires and truces, are increasing. While they mitigate the impact of violence and undeniably save lives, they are often fragile and violated. Several ceasefires and truces, particularly in inter-State conflicts, have held for decades with the support of peace operations. However, they are often less sustainable. Other conflicts simmer with low-level hostilities and without solution. Some regional organizations and security frameworks – traditional bulwarks against conflict – have become fragmented or dysfunctional, making it harder to resolve conflicts and make peace. In order to continue to deliver coordinated and effective responses in this deteriorating environment, the United Nations has invested in strengthening its institutional partnership with regional actors. The adoption of landmark Security Council resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#) is a case in point.

8. Differences among members of the Security Council – and of the United Nations more broadly – on how conflicts should end has made collective multilateral action difficult, precisely when this is needed most. Consequently, Member State consensus on when to deploy peace operations, what they should do and what constitutes success is increasingly challenging to reach. The Council still regularly renews mandates of existing peace operations and sometimes establishes new ones. Yet, amid increasing geopolitical polarization and divisions, it often struggles to provide consistent and unified political support for operations, sometimes rolling over existing mandates rather than adjusting them to respond to developments on the ground. This, along with a mismatch between complex mandates and resources in several operations, makes it hard for peace operations to respond effectively to evolving and increasingly complex realities.

9. Today, many missions operate in places where levels of violence are high, civilians face acute threats, political negotiations are stalled or absent altogether and national consensus on the direction of a political process is lacking. Many settings are impacted by transnational organized crime, violent extremism, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the effects of climate change. Peacekeepers are frequently exposed to direct attacks, asymmetric tactics and severe operational risks as they carry out their mandates. Political divisions at the international and regional levels regarding the role of United Nations peace operations in such contexts can, and often do, undermine their effectiveness.

10. New technologies bring opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of peace operations in various ways. However, the weaponization of such technologies undermines missions' ability to operate effectively and safely when they are not adequately equipped to anticipate, understand and counter such threats.

11. In sum, there is a growing paradox. On the one hand, Member States are united in supporting United Nations peace operations as critical for maintaining international peace and security, while highlighting the need to urgently adapt to increasingly complex challenges, as outlined in the Pact for the Future. The Security Council regularly reiterates that peacekeeping is essential and, most recently, in March 2026, Member States found consensus in expressing their continued strong support in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. On the other hand, the shifting positions and priorities of several Member States, including host States, have undermined support for peace operations and have led to a push to withdraw several missions. The question of whether to retain or discontinue a peace operation can present a difficult trade-off, but the consequences of an abrupt withdrawal can be severe: it may narrow options for subsequent political engagement and international support for a political solution, and it can leave civilians in the crossfire.

12. The positions of States hosting peace operations have also evolved. In some cases, there is a discrepancy between the expectations of host Governments and communities and the support that missions can provide, either based on their

mandates and available resources or due to operational shortcomings. Such misalignments can result in deteriorated relations between missions and host Governments, at times manifesting in unacceptable obstructions of missions in implementing their mandates.

13. In addition, funding pressures have presented significant challenges for peace operations. In response to the severe liquidity crisis impacting peacekeeping, thousands of peacekeepers had to be repatriated beginning in the fall of 2025, critically impacting the capacities of missions to deliver on their mandates.

Need for a new global consensus around peace operations

14. United Nations peace operations are critical in this more complex environment. They carry out peacemaking and mediation, protect civilians in conflict, secure and observe ceasefires and prevent the renewal or escalation of hostilities. They also support national efforts to return to stability and to build and sustain peace, while working with regional and subregional partners. During the extensive consultations conducted for this review, Member States highlighted the crucial impact of peace operations and agreed that missions must continue to adapt – to the new conflict environment, the new financial constraints faced by the United Nations and, critically, the new geopolitical realities. Member States committed themselves to ensuring that peace operations were fit for this new era. They recognized such operations as a unique instrument, backed by the universal membership of the United Nations, with technical and operational capabilities and expertise unmatched by most other actors.

15. A deeper, more united political commitment and clear strategic choices by Member States are necessary for peace operations to deliver results. The recommendations in this report support such choices. They require Member State ownership. Most of all, they are informed by a determination to ensure that peace operations become more nimble, targeted, flexible and cost-effective.

II. Spectrum of United Nations peace operations

16. While the term United Nations peace operations is used with different connotations, the Pact for the Future defined it as comprising peacekeeping operations and special political missions. The idea of a “spectrum” of peace operations dates back to the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which noted that the United Nations had a uniquely broad spectrum of peace operations – a continuum of peace and security tools – that it could draw on to deliver situation-specific responses.

Definitions

Special political missions. These are civilian missions deployed on the basis of legislative mandates from the Security Council or the General Assembly, most commonly under Chapter VI of the Charter, on the pacific settlement of disputes. Their mandates are related to good offices, peacemaking, fact-finding, preventive diplomacy, the implementation of peace agreements, sanctions monitoring and peacebuilding. Special political missions include envoys and their offices tasked with the good offices functions of mediation and building dialogue, regional offices with a preventive diplomacy focus, panels of experts monitoring Council sanctions regimes, civilian missions supporting political transitions and the implementation of peace agreements and integrated peacebuilding offices supporting peace consolidation.

Peacekeeping operations. These are unique global partnerships between the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, troop and police contributors and host Governments intended to maintain international peace and security and to assist countries in the difficult transition from conflict to lasting peace. They are guided by the basic principles of the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate. Peacekeeping operations are political tools designed and deployed as part of a broader strategy in support of viable political processes and solutions. They aim to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist the parties in implementing political agreements achieved through peacemaking efforts. Depending on the mandate and context, peacekeeping operations can leverage civilian, military and police capabilities to carry out a broad range of peacemaking, peacebuilding and security tasks and often include the protection of civilians. Even when a peace process becomes deadlocked and levels of violence remain high, peacekeeping operations have been effective in bolstering ceasefires and in containing the spread and spillover of violence.

Peace enforcement operations. These are operations authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter and mandated to apply a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. The Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations or multinational coalitions for enforcement action under its authority. Council-mandated peace support operations deployed by the African Union fall under this category.

17. Many of these operations have supported parties during complex political transitions from civil war to peace, through support for institution-building, the extension of State authority and peacebuilding. Some have been highly specialized, for example, supporting the international verification, monitoring and promotion of human rights and accountability processes and carrying out border demarcations. They are, at times, focused on one specific aspect of a conflict when the space for a broader, more comprehensive resolution is not there.

18. The spectrum of United Nations peace operations represents a broad menu of options that can be tailored to specific contextual parameters and a well-defined end state to be achieved through their deployment. What mission is deployed and how it is designed will depend on several factors. Chief among those is what the United Nations is requested to support, whether it is, for example: to monitor a limited set of security arrangements and protect civilians while the conflict is ongoing; to bring the parties to the table to achieve a ceasefire or peace agreement or perform specific security tasks in support of a political settlement; to implement a comprehensive peace agreement or its parts; or to help advance a broader set of peacebuilding priorities. In many cases, these parameters will evolve over time, making it important to flexibly shift and adapt mandates and operations systematically.

19. Peace operations often work in tandem with a broader set of actors. In some settings, the Security Council has deployed operations in sequenced or parallel configurations. For example, a regional office or envoy may operate alongside a country-specific mission, allowing for a complementary approach in tackling cross-boundary issues. Similarly, United Nations peace operations may be deployed in sequence or in parallel with regionally led missions or other non-United Nations-led

forces authorized by the Council. Ensuring strategic coherence when missions are co-deployed is critical.

United Nations peacekeeping and the use of force


20. Within the wider spectrum of United Nations peace operations (see figure below), a defining feature of peacekeeping is its ability to use force in self-defence and in defence of the mandate. Peacekeepers can and must act robustly, where mandated, to protect civilians from imminent threats and mass atrocities, reduce threats from non-State armed groups and suppress significant threats to a political process. At the same time, peacekeeping is guided by clear doctrinal parameters. Consequently, the use of force by peacekeepers must remain constrained in scope and duration, and its goals and related risks must be carefully considered. The utility of peacekeeping operations diminishes where consent to their presence is significantly eroding or where their impartiality is questioned. Peacekeepers are not equipped to conduct sustained peace enforcement tasks or to impose political solutions by force, and they should not be tasked with such enforcement action, which remains beyond the scope of United Nations peace operations.

Peace enforcement

21. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, peace enforcement may involve a range of coercive measures undertaken with the authorization of the Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may involve the use of military force at the strategic level to defeat or neutralize one or more armed actors. Unlike United Nations peace operations, enforcement action does not necessarily require the strategic consent of the conflict parties. The Council can mandate a multinational force or a regional or subregional organization to carry out an enforcement mandate. Such efforts should be embedded in a comprehensive approach that prioritizes political solutions and addresses conflict drivers and grievances, anchored in a national commitment towards durable peace. There must be full compliance with the Charter and international humanitarian and human rights law and accountability to the Council. Without safeguards, securitized responses risk reinforcing the dynamics they seek to overcome.

22. In a number of recent settings, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mali and Somalia, United Nations peace operations have operated alongside Security Council-authorized peace enforcement operations by non-United Nations forces, carrying out mandates focused on supporting national political processes and wider peace consolidation tasks, among other tasks (see box above and figure below). The United Nations has also helped provide support to these non-United Nations forces on a range of other issues, such as promoting strategic coherence among the different partners involved and providing expertise on normative, logistical and operational issues, including through training, capacity-building or direct support. In the cases of Haiti and Somalia, the Council established United Nations support offices to provide logistical and other assistance to the non-United Nations forces (for relevant recommendations, see sect. IV.H).

Spectrum of United Nations peace operations



Legend

United Nations peace operations		Other instruments	
 	Peacekeeping operations	 	Non-United Nations peace enforcement operations
 	Special political missions	 	Secretary-General initiatives

Abbreviations: AUSSOM, African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia; CNMC, Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission; MONUSCO, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; PESG, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General; SESG, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMID, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNIPSIL, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone; UNITAD, United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant; UN-OPCW, United Nations-Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; UNOWAS, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNVMC, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia.

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to figure)

Note: The spectrum of United Nations peace operations, presented in this figure in blue (peacekeeping operations) and purple (special political missions), covers the different types of United Nations peace operations that have been deployed over the past two decades. The figure also includes non-United Nations peace enforcement operations (presented in orange) and initiatives of the Secretary-General (presented in green).

^a Different types and configurations of peacekeeping operations are represented in blue. More traditional peacekeeping mandates may include tasks such as observation, monitoring and reporting, verification, interpositioning and supporting confidence-building between parties and helping implement ceasefire or peace agreements. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations may further include mandates to facilitate a political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, assist in restoring the rule of law and support policing, including, where specifically mandated, limited executive law-enforcement functions. Thus, peacekeeping often contributes to a comprehensive strategy for peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Peacekeeping operations may be deployed under different operational modalities, including as stand-alone missions or alongside, in partnership with or in a hybrid or sequenced manner with, regional organizations.

^b A diverse range of special political missions are represented in purple. These include special and personal envoys (with country-specific, multi-country or regional mandates) tasked with peacemaking, fact-finding and investigative missions, technical missions to support specific aspects of crisis management while hostilities are ongoing, verification and observer missions deployed to support the implementation of specific aspects of a peace agreements, regional offices with mandates in preventive diplomacy, special coordinator offices and multidimensional special political missions deployed to support political processes aiming for a return to or consolidation of peace and stability in a particular country. Not captured in the chart are special political missions supporting Security Council sanctions regimes, which are deployed under Chapter VII of the Charter, but which have no enforcement power or uniformed component.

^c Initiatives undertaken under the Secretary-General's good offices role and other engagements related to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking or helping initiate, sustain and facilitate dialogue between States or between States and other actors are represented in green. Some good offices initiatives may be subsequently mandated by the Security Council and converted into special political missions; others have laid the groundwork for the deployment of peacekeeping operations.

^d Non-United Nations missions mandated by the Security Council for the purposes of peace enforcement, deployed by regional organizations or arrangements or by ad hoc coalitions are represented in orange. These presences may be co-deployed with United Nations peace operations. In some circumstances, the deployment of a non-United Nations peace enforcement operation may be designed to create conditions for the subsequent deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

III. Resetting peace operations for a new geopolitical era

23. Against the deteriorating global peace and security environment described in this report, peace operations must adapt. Building on the New Agenda for Peace, I propose a reset that requires that the United Nations and its Member States resolutely and collectively advance the following priorities – some new and some long-standing, but all requiring a renewed commitment:

(a) **A sharp focus on peacemaking.** A primary *raison d'être* shared across peace operations is to help conflict parties reach political solutions and implement a political agreement to end the conflict – whether directly or by helping create conditions for political processes to advance. Politics, diplomacy, dialogue and, indeed, peacemaking are the core work of this Organization. They remain the best tools for preventing, mitigating and resolving conflicts, building trust, easing strategic rivalries and bridging global divides. To make peace, there is no alternative to

bringing conflict parties to the table and helping them reach an agreement. It is painstaking work that requires patient, creative and stubborn engagement. But it also requires the right set of instruments and approaches to support operational responses, from discreet engagement aimed at increasing trust to more visible diplomatic action aimed at finding common ground and building bridges between opposing parties;

(b) **A stronger partnership with host States.** States hosting peace operations and their societies are responsible for making and implementing decisions and policy choices needed to achieve sustainable peace. Peace operations support these efforts. The views of host States, along with those of other stakeholders critical to achieving peace, need to be taken into consideration when designing and reviewing mandates. A shared vision between the Security Council, host States and the Secretariat about the objectives of peace operations is critical, along with an agreement on the capabilities and time required for it to succeed. Peace operations may be deployed when political authority and control are contested or fragmented among multiple actors. This can make engagement with host States and conflict parties a sensitive task for peace operations, requiring the close support of United Nations intergovernmental bodies and Member States. Support for national actors in strengthening their institutions and ensuring that peace operations leave a sustainable, positive legacy for host States and communities, strengthening social contracts at the national level, will continue to be imperative to ensuring lasting peace and security;

(c) **The pursuit of political solutions.** The primacy of politics remains a central tenet of peace operations. Peace operations must be deployed on the basis and in support of a clearly identified political process. The Security Council should provide its full support throughout, with active, continuous and coherent engagement with all parties;

(d) **Impartiality.** The strongest asset of the United Nations is its impartiality. It must be fiercely and vigorously exercised – in brokering peace agreements, in pursuing political solutions and throughout the work of peace operations;

(e) **Respect for obligations.** Peacekeepers must be respected and protected, and those who harm peacekeepers must be held accountable; effective measures must be put in place for this purpose. Host countries have an obligation to respect the privileges and immunities of United Nations peace operations and their personnel;

(f) **A global partnership for peacekeeping.** Peacekeeping operations depend on shared responsibility, collective resolve and a strong political commitment to the peace processes that a mission is mandated to support. They have a higher chance of success when Member States and the Secretariat act in unity, providing sustained political support, generating and deploying high-performing and specialized capabilities and strengthening partnerships with and among troop- and police-contributing countries. This successful partnership, advanced through the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, must continue to deepen trust, enhance accountability for performance and conduct and ensure that peacekeepers are equipped and prepared to deliver on their mandates and supported in doing so;

(g) **More focused and more adaptable mandates.** The future of peace operations lies in mission mandates that are sharply focused on areas where they have a comparative advantage, particularly with regard to political and security tasks. This includes the protection of civilians, where mandated. The Security Council should also continuously adapt mandates and prioritize mission tasks based on the evolving context, including to ensure effective and timely drawdown. Peace operations must work towards a clearly defined and achievable end state, as determined by the Council, and be accountable for their impact. Meanwhile, their mandates and tasks must be aligned with realistic resource levels, adapted on the basis of

multi-stakeholder analyses to match the realities and demands on the ground, set up for, and assessed against, realistic goals;

(h) **Exit strategies and viable transition plans.** As outlined in the Pact for the Future, we need to ensure that peace operations are deployed with exit strategies and viable transition plans and that they engage in planning transitions with host countries, the United Nations country team and relevant national stakeholders. Exit strategies and transitions from peace operations need to be planned at the earliest possible stage and in an integrated and iterative manner to achieve successful mission drawdowns and ensure that gains are consolidated. The abrupt or premature withdrawal of a peace operation risks undoing hard-won gains;

(i) **A whole-of-United Nations response to the challenge of sustaining peace.** As future peace operations focus on political and security mandates, the wider United Nations system – notably agencies, funds and programmes in the country – will drive programmatic delivery where it is best placed to do so. This clearer division of labour will enhance coherence, eliminate duplication, facilitate transitions and contribute to sustainable peacebuilding after missions depart. The broader United Nations intergovernmental machinery has an important role to play in ensuring that networked peace operations can deliver sustainable results. Predictable and sufficient resources for programmatic delivery are critical;

(j) **A normative commitment and a focus on people.** The work of peace operations must be grounded in the Charter, as well as in international law more broadly, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It must also focus on people and communities. Promoting indivisible human rights, protecting people, strengthening the social contract, helping societies tackle both the drivers and manifestations of conflict and ensuring that communities benefit from tangible peace dividends remain central tasks for national Governments, which peace operations must vigorously support. A strengthened partnership with communities, including civil society organizations, is also essential. Peace operations must continue to integrate the transformative agendas on women and peace and security and youth and peace and security – advanced by the Security Council in its resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and subsequent resolutions and its resolution [2250 \(2015\)](#), respectively – into their political and security work;

(k) **Readiness for agile, tailored responses.** To keep peace operations fit for purpose, we need to move towards nimble adaptable models. The Secretariat needs to retain its ability to swiftly implement Security Council decisions if and when requested. Peace operations must be equipped with the right set of capabilities to operate effectively, while being agile and tailored to the specific tasks required. The United Nations must be able to deploy personnel and resources where they matter most.

(l) **A culture of efficiency.** As Member States consider their investment in multilateral responses, it is incumbent upon the Organization to use its resources in a way that ensures the greatest impact at the lowest possible cost to fulfil mandates. The UN80 Initiative has indicated multiple ways to achieve this. Peace operations are an important part of the Initiative;

(m) **Closing the technology gap.** Peace operations must draw responsibly on new technologies and capabilities to implement their mandates effectively and stay safe. It is unacceptable that peacekeepers operate in dangerous environments without the necessary equipment. Greater access to contemporary technologies and capabilities are critical for greater effectiveness and efficiency, including in protecting civilians;

(n) **An interconnected multilateral system.** Peace operations must work even more closely and flexibly with a wide array of non-United Nations actors, in

particular regional and subregional organizations and Member States. Collaboration with regional organizations must be based on comparative advantages and respond to the unique dynamics on the ground – there is no one-size-fits-all model for mission type, configuration or leadership;

(o) **A more just and representative multilateral system.** The Security Council still reflects the geopolitical realities of 1945, not the world of today. As we adapt peace operations to a changing geopolitical reality, we must summon the political will to forge a more representative Council, starting with addressing the historical injustice against Africa and improving the representation of the global South. This is about ensuring that the Council is fit for purpose and able to act with credibility and effectiveness.

IV. Recommendations and commitments

A. Prioritizing peacemaking, preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of disputes

24. In a world of proliferating wars, the United Nations must reinvest in peacemaking and good offices preventive diplomacy. This includes redoubling efforts to address resurgent inter-State conflicts. Global divisions and polarization, including within the Security Council, are not an excuse for inaction. The Secretariat is responsible for helping bridge different perspectives, supporting Council agreement on a shared analysis of threats and providing the Council with options around which consensus could be found. Political courage, risk-taking and creativity are essential.

25. Peacemaking, always challenging, has become more so in the current environment. It may fail, possibly even in the majority of cases. The United Nations must be ready to try again; often, there is no better alternative. We need both tenacity and humility to stay the course. Successful peacemaking can transform societies. But even when our efforts do not succeed, there is value in engaging, in maintaining channels of communication, in preventing further deterioration and managing the conflict and in identifying new opportunities, often fleeting, as they open up. Most of this must be done behind the scenes. But it requires political support, both discreet and public.

26. Not all, or even most, situations require the deployment of a peace operation for peacemaking. In an environment of significant resource constraints and reduced political space, we must return to the practice of using existing Headquarters political capacities, deployable as part of the Secretary-General's good offices, to conduct fact-finding, identify diplomatic entry points, facilitate dialogue among parties and propose creative avenues for de-escalation.

27. The existing network of regional offices and envoys is an important part of this work and should be strengthened where appropriate. In a world in which conflicts are increasingly regionalized, peacemaking must be, too. These small presences are cost-effective and allow the United Nations to establish close operational partnerships with regional organizations and to engage proactively to help Member States address emerging conflict, including inter-State conflict. They provide the Organization with the necessary capacity to engage in preventive diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, build confidence, support regional cooperation and confidence-building and create space for political solutions. They also play an important role in United Nations mission transitions, often absorbing residual political tasks when in-country peace operations withdraw. They work in close cooperation with other United Nations

regional presences, including the United Nations regional commissions, to help align United Nations action with the shared goal of sustainable peace.

28. The new, more fragmented peacemaking landscape is both a feature and a symptom of the new multipolar order: it requires the United Nations to work closely with different peacemaking actors, including Member States. In some places, the United Nations must be more proactive and forward-leaning in leading good offices efforts. In others, it can provide advice and expertise. The overall goal is to ensure that peace processes are better designed and peace agreements not only implementable and sustainable, but also more inclusive and norm-based. Ensuring adequate implementation is necessary to avoid a failure or relapse into conflict, as is the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in political and peace processes.

29. **I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:**

(a) **In line with action 16 of the Pact for the Future and Security Council resolution 2788 (2025), the United Nations commits to a systematic offer of its good offices to help the parties to intra- or inter-State conflicts resolve their disputes through peaceful means. Member States are encouraged to make use of this offer. The Secretary-General will engage, either directly or through senior representatives, in listening tours and exploratory talks with conflict actors and those with influence on them to identify potential entry points and create political space for dialogue. The Secretariat shall also enhance the deployability of Headquarters resources and creative approaches in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to ensure that peacemaking is a full-throttle activity for the Secretariat and its peace operations;**

(b) **In view of the important peacemaking role they can play in helping Member States address increasingly regionalized conflict, as well as inter-State conflict, the network of United Nations regional offices and envoys should be expanded. The Secretariat will engage in consultations with all regions to that effect;**

(c) **The Security Council should make full use of its responsibilities under Article 34 of the Charter and engage more regularly in fact-finding in cases of disputes that may represent a threat to international peace and security, including through greater use of its visits to countries or regions affected by conflict. This would help foster a common understanding among Council members of the possible options for the pacific settlement of disputes in each case. The Secretariat will conduct impartial fact-finding in support of diplomacy and de-escalation and, when appropriate, to support the Council with unvarnished analysis to help establish a shared factual basis and options for further action;**

(d) **Given the urgent need to halt or de-escalate violence, including through ceasefire agreements, the United Nations commits itself to enhancing the Secretariat's ability to support Member States in ceasefire negotiations and implementation, including in inter-State contexts, through knowledge, best practices, deployable expertise and implementation support capacity, as well as its embrace of new technologies in such support.**

B. Towards a new partnership with host States

30. Host State consent and cooperation are cornerstones of effective peace operations. Missions are designed to support Member States in preventing and resolving conflicts and, often, to enable nationally led peacebuilding. Over the past eight decades, peace operations have worked with countries through fragile

transitions from war to peace, helping host States rebuild. Success came when local stakeholders and missions worked with shared purpose and mutual trust. However, this process is never linear and can be politically challenging in conflict contexts where host State authority is fragmented or disputed and where the Security Council takes measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security. The reality for several peace operations is that they not only rely on constructive collaboration with the host State or States, but also impartially engage with parties to conflict to implement their mandates and support a political process. In some settings, we have seen a fraying of the partnership between peace operations and host States. Peace operations cannot supplant the will and commitment of the conflict parties and can only be effective if their mandates support the parties in meeting their commitments. Member States, notably through the Council, must provide their full and unified support to missions in strengthening their relations with their host State or States.

31. I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:

(a) The Security Council should build structured processes to consistently seek the views and priorities of the host State or States, while considering the perspectives of other parties, where relevant, including in the establishment of a mission and in subsequent mandate reviews. Special attention should be given to periods of political transition. In the mandating stage, along with briefings and analyses by the Secretariat, the Council should explore visits to the relevant countries to clarify expectations and priorities;

(b) Following the creation of a new peacekeeping mandate or the renewal of existing ones, the Security Council should consider establishing a political mechanism or compact on mutual commitments between the Council, the Secretariat and the host State or States affirming host State consent with the mission's strategic purpose, key uniformed capabilities, equipment and technological enablers that are required for its success. The involvement of other relevant parties should be considered in developing such compacts, where appropriate;

(c) The Security Council should conduct an ongoing, structured and transparent dialogue with host States and troop- and police-contributing countries, as appropriate, to maintain trust, address concerns and provide clear operational parameters within which technological capabilities can be used.

C. Focused and adaptable mandates

32. It is essential to be realistic about what peace operations can achieve. Missions should focus on a set of prioritized tasks aimed at halting or de-escalating violence and at pursuing political settlements, in particular where comprehensive peace agreements are absent. Where a political settlement has been reached and a mission is mandated to provide broader support, a clear prioritization of tasks becomes even more important.

33. Amid levels of violence against civilians not seen since the founding of the United Nations, we must do more to protect civilians. The most effective way to do this is to end conflicts. This will continue to be the focus of our work. But saving lives cannot wait. Peacekeeping operations will continue to prioritize the protection of civilians as a whole-of-mission objective in accordance with their mandate. Moreover, the United Nations Agenda for Protection underscores that protection is central to everything the United Nations does, whether before, during or after a peace operation is deployed. Upholding international human rights principles and

institutions and strengthening the protection and promotion of human rights is a foundation for sustained peace.

34. In a number of cases, mission mandates, structures and objectives have been too static in the face of changing realities, leaving them out of step with the situation on the ground. This can complicate efforts to mobilize the unified political support of the membership needed for peace operations to be effective. Thus, making mandates more adaptable is a political task for the Security Council and the Secretariat. It requires the Council to agree on a clear and achievable end state of what a peace operation can deliver. It requires the development of stronger mechanisms for regular mandate reviews to ensure that the operation remains fit for purpose. The Secretariat, too, must assist the Council in its function of political oversight by presenting frank analyses of results and options for clear, prioritized and focused mission mandates based on the evolving situation on the ground, and it must further improve its ability to assess impact achieved against targets. A central dictum of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (commonly referred to as “the Brahimi report”) ([A/55/305-S/2000/809](#)) remains true: the Secretariat must tell the Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear.

35. I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:

(a) In its initial mandate, particularly in contexts without a comprehensive peace agreement with demands for broad United Nations support, the Security Council should design peace operations with mandates focused on political and security functions. These mandates should prioritize advancing a political process or, in its absence, help create conditions for such a process to emerge;

(b) The Security Council should ensure that protection considerations and outcomes are central to the planning, mandating and resourcing of peacekeeping operations, where appropriate and advisable, to allow peacekeepers to act decisively in response to threats to civilians, drawing on the full range of capacities and capabilities and leveraging integrated threat analysis, proactive deployments and mission mobility;

(c) When deploying peace operations, the Security Council should agree on a long-term strategic vision of the end state that the peace operation is designed to achieve. This vision, for which the Secretariat should provide advice and options, should include shorter-term, time-bound objectives, to provide a basis for measuring progress and adjusting mission priorities as conditions evolve, and an exit strategy. While shorter-term objectives will change as the situation changes, they should be anchored in the overarching political vision;

(d) The Security Council should use mandate renewals as a strategic opportunity to adapt mission priorities. Recognizing the politically sensitive environments in which we operate, the Secretariat will provide a realistic and balanced assessment to the Security Council of the progress made towards the achievement of the mandate and defined mission targets, as well as obstacles encountered. This assessment should be based on a clear-eyed analysis of the situation on the ground and of mission impact consultations with host States and conflict parties, as well as the views of relevant stakeholders. As required, it will also provide options for:

- (i) The reconfiguration of the mission;**
- (ii) New tasks to be incorporated into the mandate;**
- (iii) Tasks to be discontinued;**

(iv) **Transition plans and exit strategies, where appropriate;**

(e) **As appropriate, and without prejudice to the authority of the General Assembly over budgetary matters, options by the Secretary-General on mandate creation and adjustment will provide indicative resource estimates to enable more informed consideration of the practical implications of different mandate options and strengthen the alignment of mandates and resources;**

(f) **To strengthen the quality of joined-up options presented to the Security Council, drawing on the full spectrum of peace operations, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations will strengthen support for regional divisions in joint strategic planning, to inform mission design and adjustment and to ensure the regular preparation of mission reconfiguration options for presentation to the Council, as referred to in recommendation (d) (i) above.**

D. Division of labour between peace operations and the wider United Nations system to maximize collective impact

36. United Nations peace operations make important contributions in creating an enabling environment for longer-term peacebuilding. They deploy along with a range of other United Nations actors who contribute to building and sustaining peace. Over time, United Nations cooperation mechanisms have been established to maximize collective impact, based on frameworks for integrated assessment and planning. Yet, in the current global context and as outlined in the UN80 Initiative, the United Nations must strive even more to achieve a networked approach and strategic division of labour that fully leverages our comparative advantages.

37. As announced in the report entitled “Shifting paradigms: united to deliver” ([A/80/392](#)), future peace operations will innovate to implement civilian mandates better by taking steps to delegate relevant programmatic tasks, along with the associated resources, to the United Nations system entities best placed to implement them, and to avoid duplication, while continuing to cooperate closely with United Nations country teams. This effort will also be aligned with proposals made under the UN80 Initiative work packages on country configuration and regional reset.

38. Where missions are focused on political and security tasks, it will be important to identify ways for United Nations system entities to advance areas of peace consolidation not included in the mandate of the peace operation, within the Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks.

39. This networked approach helps ensure that United Nations system entities are able to continue their peacebuilding activities in the country concerned after a mission departs, thus making transitions of the United Nations presence in the country more sustainable. At the same time, capacity and financing gaps must be addressed in the planning process and followed by a commitment by Member States to provide the required resources. Integrated planning across the United Nations system, including transitions planning, initiated at the earliest possible stage with host States and relevant national stakeholders and in partnership with international financial institutions, will be critical to operationalizing this, including by tapping into innovative financing modalities.

40. **I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:**

(a) **To enable the delegation of relevant programmatic tasks and associated resources by the Secretary-General to the United Nations system entities best equipped to deliver them, in areas such as the rule of law,**

governance and child protection, the Secretariat has reviewed the relevant legal, budgetary, financial and administrative considerations as part of the commitment made under the UN80 Initiative to strengthen the delivery of civilian mandates. The Secretariat will devise modalities to ensure that results will be transparently reported through missions for clear accountability to Member States;

(b) Peace operations and United Nations system entities should strengthen shared analysis and planning, to ensure coherence, particularly in non-integrated contexts, irrespective of the configuration of the United Nations presence;

(c) We must leverage our considerable specialized capacities more flexibly in support of peace operations and peacebuilding. Such capacities, now consolidated within the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office, include police, justice and corrections, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction. As many of these capacities can also benefit peace-sustaining activities in other settings, we will make them available to support Member States, upon their request, including through United Nations system entities;

(d) Other relevant United Nations intergovernmental bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the executive boards, within their respective mandates, should help provide political support and financial backing for the peacebuilding activities provided by other United Nations system entities in support of the host State or States;

(e) Where peace operations are deployed, the promotion and protection of indivisible human rights must remain a priority. This is vital for political processes, peace agreements and sustainable peace;

(f) The Peacebuilding Commission should be leveraged as a central platform to sustain international attention and to ensure an integrated, strategic and coordinated approach in line with the 2025 peacebuilding architecture review, including to support and accompany national prevention strategies;

(g) Member States should ensure adequate financial support for missions and agencies, programmes and funds to meet the peacebuilding requirements in the transition and post-mandate period, for example, by maintaining residual funding for peacebuilding activities in areas of gradual mission departure. The Peacebuilding Fund and multi-partner trust funds must be used to their full potential, along with more systematic and strategic collaboration with international financial institutions at the country level.

E. Enabling agile peace operations

41. Mandates that are fit for purpose must be complemented by administrative frameworks to enable peace operations to allocate the available budgetary and human resources to priorities and plans identified. The Secretariat must fully utilize its authority to adjust priorities and deploy personnel and resources flexibly to maximize impact. Member States must seize the opportunity to review administrative frameworks that hamstring peace operations.

42. In peacekeeping, core planning and operational processes across all mission components must be strengthened, to enable more agile and coherent responses in dynamic and complex environments, and aligned with appropriate command structures.

43. Missions and Headquarters, working closely with all key stakeholders, must develop a longer-term vision and a political strategy, which must then be effectively translated into mission plans and measurable targets. These plans must be rigorously prioritized and linked to resources, then implemented and monitored, with a view to adapting them to changed circumstances, successes and failures, in a coherent and coordinated manner.

44. **I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:**

(a) **The Secretariat will work to bolster core planning and operational processes through strategic and operational support for peacekeeping missions, capacity-building and training, as well as policy development, in consultation with Member States. Where possible within available capacities, we will systematically pool joint analyses, data analytics and planning capabilities across mission components and, where relevant, with country teams;**

(b) **The Secretariat, closely engaging with Member States, will conduct a review of peacekeeping mission structures, including command and control arrangements across the strategic, operational and tactical levels, to consider what adjustments to policy frameworks may be necessary to enable more adaptable mission designs;**

(c) **The Secretariat will review potential obstacles that prevent heads of mission, despite their delegated authority, from making mission adaptations more flexibly in response to evolving needs and changes to the mandate;**

(d) **The Secretariat will promote increasing the pool of qualified applicants, particularly from unrepresented and underrepresented Member States, and ensuring gender parity. We will implement stringent performance measures for all personnel, including through recognition of outstanding performance and by addressing underperformance;**

(e) **The United Nations must preserve progress to date and further advance the participation of women in all aspects of peace operations, including by continuing to invest in enabling mission work environments for workforce diversity.**

F. Cost-efficient and accountable peace operations

45. The United Nations is fully committed to cost-efficiency in all its peace operations, as a means to maximize mandate delivery and sustain Member State support. Senior United Nations mission leaders and all staff members must promote and support this vision. Such a commitment begins with more focused, tailored and prioritized mandates, concentrating on the areas in which United Nations peace operations have a comparative advantage, to enhance effectiveness and use resources more efficiently.

46. The UN80 Initiative has delivered efficiencies and resource reductions for individual peace operations, in addition to the 2026/27 budget proposals for peacekeeping missions. It initiated the reconfiguration of several missions to optimize our presences and identify cost-efficient ways to implement mandates. Revised estimates for the 2026 budgets of special political missions represented a \$96.3 million (21.6 per cent), reduction compared to the programme budget proposed initially. These savings were realized with a focus on functional streamlining and organizational optimization, including through the proposed closure of field offices in different missions, cost optimization and the leveraging of technology. Indeed, there will be reliance on Headquarters capacities to lead and staff, where appropriate,

specific functions previously carried out by special political missions. The United Nations is committed to maximizing the use of such capacities, including in peacemaking engagements.

47. For peacekeeping, the 2026/27 budget proposal reflects a budget reduction of nearly half a billion dollars. The reductions reflect key organizational transformation initiatives, including the introduction of a new staffing model that aligns support account resources with the evolving mandates, number, size and complexity of peacekeeping operations, as well as the consolidation of transactional administrative and financial services through the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda.

48. To further strengthen mission operations while maximizing cost efficiency, the Secretariat is systematically reviewing and modernizing its support models to deliver sustainable efficiency gains, cost avoidance and improved service delivery. Targeted measures in air operations have enhanced flexibility and reduced costs. Additional initiatives across movement control, aviation, supply chain management, fuel and energy, rations, fleet management and medical support are being implemented to reinforce operational effectiveness and scalability. Collectively, these efforts, supported by Member States, have the potential to generate significant and sustainable savings.

49. We will continue to promote a culture of efficiency across all peace operations and mission components, in all relevant strategies, policies, assessments, budgets and operational plans. This includes the efficient use of human resources and capacities. Despite progress achieved through the Secretary-General's management reforms, our operations are still too often hamstrung by rigid administrative rules and overburdened by sometimes competing demands beyond those they already receive from the lead department, which risks reducing the clarity of accountability lines.

50. Member States must pay assessed contributions in full and on time. The success of all United Nations peace operations depends on this. Delays or shortfalls in payments negatively impact reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing countries, constrain operational planning, disrupt mission delivery and increase costs.

51. Peace operations must demonstrate tangible progress towards mandated objectives. If objectives are no longer achievable, or when missions are unable to deliver on their goals, their mandates should be adjusted by the Security Council or, when appropriate, the mission withdrawn. Any decision to adjust or withdraw a mission, even when it is unable to fully achieve its mandate, should carefully balance the implications and risks, including those related to protection of civilians or potential conflict spillover. Strengthening accountability for results is essential to sustaining the legitimacy, efficiency and effectiveness of peace operations. Accountability must be grounded in political realism and reflect the complex environments in which missions operate, where outcomes are impacted not only by mission performance, but also by host State cooperation, regional dynamics and Council unity.

52. Measuring mission impact is not a technical exercise removed from political realities. It is intended to foster a culture of strategic focus, results orientation, transparency and continuous learning, thus ensuring that peace operations remain efficient, effective, responsive and credible in an increasingly complex global landscape.

53. Accountable peace operations must embed the highest standards of conduct by their leaders and personnel as a core element of preparedness and performance. Participation in peacekeeping missions must reflect a clear commitment by contributing countries and commanders on the ground to preventing and addressing misconduct by the personnel they deploy, in particular in relation to sexual

exploitation and abuse. This includes taking action regarding outstanding allegations from the past, including unresolved paternity claims. Such action will be a criterion for participation in future deployments.

54. The quality of leadership is a crucial factor in the success or failure of United Nations peace operations. Special representatives or envoys must combine a unique set of attributes: they must be diplomats with the negotiation skills to broker political agreements; managers of complex operations; custodians of resources; and decision makers in times of crisis. They must have courage, vision, impartiality, integrity and humility, and they must be willing to take calculated risks, even when the odds of success are low.

55. **I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:**

(a) **As stewards of Member States' resources, the United Nations will uphold the highest standards of financial integrity across all peace operations by strengthening due diligence, tightening internal controls and enhancing oversight, in order to prevent waste, fraud and abuse and to address risks wherever they arise. The United Nations will intensify efforts to optimize efficiencies, while ensuring the full and effective delivery of mandated tasks. Updates will continue to be provided to the General Assembly on these measures;**

(b) **Through the UN80 Initiative, the Secretariat is streamlining coordination and maximizing cost efficiency. It is reviewing its administrative processes and practices to ensure that coherent guidance from Headquarters is provided to peace operations through the lead departments to which peace operations are accountable;**

(c) **Building on my recommendations on focused and adaptable peace operations, the United Nations will review mission structures systematically, including through civilian staffing reviews, to help ensure that these are not only optimized for mandate delivery, but also cost-efficient. These reviews will occur as a matter of good practice, particularly around mandate changes enacted by the Security Council;**

(d) **In line with Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter, the United Nations will redouble its efforts to ensure that senior officials appointed to lead peace operations are selected on the basis of the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, with the right set of skills needed to deliver on the new vision for the future of United Nations peace operations. This must be achieved with due regard to the principle of geographical representation and a commitment to achieving parity among women and men at the highest levels;**

(e) **Where violations of standards of conduct occur, accountability is the only way to provide justice and restore trust. Member States must take decisive action to hold their nationals accountable, including where misconduct amounts to criminal acts, and take action to facilitate paternity and child support claims. Countries unable to demonstrate meaningful progress towards these goals will not be considered to have met readiness and preparedness requirements for United Nations peacekeeping.**

G. Readiness for a highly dynamic future

Resilient and technology-enabled peace operations

56. Peace operations are deployed in increasingly complex settings marked by transnational and environmental threats, including those associated with climate change. To operate safely, efficiently and effectively, they must be equipped with

optimal technological capabilities. Our missions are facing a rapidly changing threat landscape, marked by the proliferation of uncrewed aerial vehicles and the widespread use of improvised explosive devices used for attacks on civilians and United Nations personnel alike. Kidnapping and arbitrary detention of United Nations and associated personnel perpetrated by both non-State armed groups and State security forces remain far too common. Threats to information integrity erode trust in peace operations and create harm to United Nations personnel. Yet, in some contexts, restrictions imposed by host States on the use of essential equipment undermine situational awareness, mandate implementation and the mitigation of critical threats. Meanwhile, there has been significant progress since 2020 to ensure accountability for crimes against peacekeepers. However, much more remains to be done. I welcome the unanimous adoption, and large joint sponsorship, of resolution [2823 \(2026\)](#) by the Security Council to facilitate the identification, investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of attacks against United Nations personnel serving in peacekeeping operations. It sends a strong message that there can be no impunity for such attacks.

57. Addressing these challenges requires accelerated efforts, despite diminished resources, towards greater crisis preparedness, by combining investments in technology with faster organizational adaptation. It also requires close engagement with host States. We must rethink accountability and risk management and invest in the systematic up-skilling of uniformed and civilian personnel.

58. The safety and security of all personnel must remain our highest collective priority. This includes ensuring access to high-quality medical support, including mental healthcare, telemedicine and reliable and rapid casualty and medical evacuation. These cannot be compromised by financial or operational pressures. I call on Member States to support these efforts.

59. **I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:**

(a) **We must better anticipate and manage risks, while making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. The Secretariat, including its peace operations, will strengthen the integrated analysis of emerging threats and trends. We will significantly expand the use of data and digital technologies to better meet operational needs and achieve greater cost efficiency. Innovative partnerships with Member States and the private sector will be critical;**

(b) **The Secretariat, in collaboration with Member States, will step up efforts to strengthen mission resilience and preparedness, including through training and capacity-building initiatives, as well as the ability to proactively counteract threats stemming from weaponized new technologies, including autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, uncrewed aerial vehicles and improvised explosive devices. We will address malicious uses of digital technologies and reinforce information integrity to enhance mission credibility and mandate delivery;**

(c) **The Secretariat, in collaboration with Member States, will enhance the operational resilience of peace operations, including by expanding the use of renewable energy systems to reduce dependencies on vulnerable fuel supply chains in high-risk, remote areas;**

(d) **Member States should step up their engagement in prosecuting perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers, with the Secretariat's full support;**

(e) **Parties to conflict and host countries must fulfil their obligations to respect and protect peacekeepers, including the obligation to respect the privileges and immunities of peace operations and their personnel.**

Capabilities, systems and personnel for agile peacekeeping operations

60. Peacekeeping operations must become more agile and better utilize technology to carry out their mandates effectively in the future. Building on lessons from operations and analytical foresight on new conflict environments, and drawing on technology, we need to review the types of capabilities and units required to ensure higher levels of mobility and situational awareness. This may require more specialized capabilities and air assets to cover vast terrain. However, any such recalibration must take into account the continued importance of directly engaging with communities and building trust.

61. We must build on the collective investments in civilian and specialized uniformed capacities that make the United Nations unique among conflict management actors. Building on the Action for Peacekeeping initiative, new models and partnerships for the provision of key capabilities must be explored, for example, to more rapidly deploy peacekeepers into missions and to increase mobility on the ground. The Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System is crucial in ensuring agility, by keeping fully vetted military units ready for rapid deployment. We must also continue to harness specialized policing capacities to support host States in investigations, community policing, public order management and the strengthening of institutional capacities, where mandated.

62. I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:

(a) **The Secretariat will initiate a study on key capabilities for military and police, including in the context of lighter and more mobile mission footprints. These capabilities include enhanced situational awareness and ceasefire monitoring and the leveraging of aviation assets and of lessons learned from the Organization's experience with maritime peacekeeping capabilities. Minimum requirements for protective and enabling equipment and technologies in both contingent-owned and United Nations-owned equipment should be collectively defined. To provide strategic guidance for this work, the Secretariat intends to convene an advisory panel and will work closely with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in this area;**

(b) **As peacekeeping deployments take on more varied configurations, so must our frameworks to manage personnel and material contributions from Member States, including to ensure more equitable burden-sharing and mutual support. We will increase the flexibility in our systems to generate forces, capabilities and personnel, including by broadening contributor categories and allowing framework nation and other arrangements to enable more diverse forms of support. We will step up triangular, South-South and other partnerships for training, for capability development and for sharing and pooling. To ensure high performance, contributing countries should avoid all caveats that have a detrimental impact on mandate implementation;**

(c) **The United Nations must transform its administrative processes and structures to ensure that personnel capacities are mobilized and brought into the right places quickly. Existing rapid deployment mechanisms for civilians should be further expanded. The Secretariat will fully leverage its existing standing capacities, contingent upon sustainable funding mechanisms. It will expand the use of standby partnerships with Member States for the deployment of specialized civilian and uniformed personnel. The Department of Peace Operations will reinforce its rapidly deployable vanguard capability to support deployable start-up teams of critical military and police capabilities. Member States should ensure adequate funding for these rapid deployment mechanisms;**

(d) We will cooperate with Member States to ensure that all deployed personnel possess the requisite technical and analytical competencies for their designated roles. We will step up our investment in United Nations training and knowledge-sharing, including through digital technologies and by developing scenario-based exercises to enhance leadership-level skills and decision-making. The United Nations will continue to strengthen the network of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.

H. Global-regional partnerships for networked peace operations

63. Over the past decade, we have prioritized developing strong cooperation with regional and subregional organizations around the world. This includes regular consultative meetings at all levels, the deployment of liaison presences and joint operations. Various peace operations, particularly regional offices and envoys, are mandated to support regional partners. These institutional relationships form the backbone for a networked approach to global-regional partnerships. Such arrangements must be tailored to and driven by needs on the ground. Comparative advantages are context-specific, to be discerned through rigorous joint analysis of the situation. Irrespective of the division of labour with regional partners, the United Nations will always remain politically engaged.

64. In forging more networked peace operations, the United Nations has gained significant experience and good practices from its institutional partnership framework with the African Union. The adoption of Security Council resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#) not only provided a framework for the financing of African Union-led peace support operations through United Nations assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis; more importantly, it represented a revitalized interpretation of Chapter VIII of the Charter to empower regional arrangements and a renewed commitment by Member States to share responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security.

65. The United Nations is likely to increasingly operate alongside other peace and security actors, including non-United Nations peace support and peace enforcement operations authorized by the Security Council. While maintaining a clear and consistent distinction towards United Nations peace operations, the Organization should be ready to support such operations by facilitating a comprehensive approach encompassing political solutions, efforts to address conflict drivers and technical support. The United Nations can act as a strategic enabler and foster interoperability and strategic coherence among diverse partners, leveraging its policies, processes and standards. Stringent measures must be in place to ensure compliance with international law and the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces. Support partnerships should be guided by the principles of shared responsibility, transparency and mutual accountability, anchored in a clear understanding of each partner's rules, regulations and governance frameworks and grounded in integrated decision-making processes.

66. **I therefore make the following recommendations and commitments:**

(a) **We will deepen regional partnerships, including in trilateral and other formats, with a focus on:**

- (i) **Strengthening shared strategic assessment and planning;**
- (ii) **Increasing our preparedness to mount operations that involve multiple partners in a variety of configurations tailored to the context, including through joint scenario-based exercises;**
- (iii) **Achieving greater interoperability;**

(b) Member States should ensure that operational partnership arrangements between the United Nations and regional organizations or multinational forces authorized by the Security Council have sufficient capacities and resources to ensure alignment and coordination at the strategic and operational levels;

(c) While progress is being made on the joint African Union-United Nations road map for the operationalization of resolution 2719 (2023), the Security Council, drawing on contexts identified jointly by the African Union and the United Nations, should be prepared to act proactively in considering and authorizing support for African Union-led peace support operations, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution. Such efforts should be guided by the primacy of politics, ensuring that any application of the resolution advances political solutions and draws on the complementary strengths of the United Nations and the African Union;

(d) When the United Nations is mandated to provide logistical or other support to non-United Nations peace operations, the Security Council should ensure that such peace operations are embedded in a broader political framework for resolving the conflict;

(e) When mandating regional or multinational peace support operations and enforcement action, the Security Council should, as appropriate, draw on and request Secretariat expertise in ensuring an inclusive political strategy and non-military approaches to addressing root causes, as well as in ensuring compliance with international law and effective accountability measures. The Secretariat will engage with Member States and experts to further examine doctrinal and operational implications and determine the appropriate frameworks and conditions under which such support can be provided;

(f) The Secretariat will maintain requisite expertise and readiness to provide technical support to non-United Nations-led forces mandated by the Security Council, where appropriate and mandated. In addition to logistical support packages, assistance could include: strategic force generation; the linking of capability and training providers to multinational forces or regional operations; and advisory support with regard to planning, analysis, command functions, conduct and discipline, international humanitarian law and human rights law, protection mandates and civilian harm mitigation, human rights due diligence and security sector reform;

(g) In situations where a United Nations peace operation is deployed alongside a non-United Nations peace enforcement operation, the Security Council should continue to ensure a clear and strict delineation of roles, responsibilities and mandated tasks, to preserve the legitimacy and effectiveness of both instruments. Both missions should work towards complementary objectives and be guided by a broader political strategy based on appropriate consultations with national and other stakeholders. In all co-deployment situations, partners should promote mutual and effective coordination and proactive strategic communication on their respective mandates;

(h) Where the United Nations is mandated to reimburse Member States for contingent-owned equipment in non-United Nations-led enforcement or peace support missions, the applicable reimbursement frameworks should be reviewed by the Fifth Committee to ensure they are fit for a wide variety of modes and configurations, while incentivizing performance and the deployment of critical enablers.